

July 19, 1973

TO: AMBASSADOR BRUCE

ETS- HK-AA 7/43

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

DOS Review Completed.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

1. You will have seen the note passed to me by PRCLO Acting Director Han Hsu on July 19 regarding the PRC position on Cambodia, and the note of July 19 inviting me to China on August 16. Obviously, I cannot agree to the date Peking proposes; I have therefore replied with a proposal suggesting that I be invited sometime after September 1 (a copy of the note we handed to the Chinese here is at Tab A). I will let you know when we have received a reply. .

2. At Tab B is a rather tough response to their note on Cambodia. I would be grateful if you would deliver it to Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua at your earliest convenience.

3. In presenting the note, you should make the following oral comments:

-- The Chinese statement on Cambodia presented to Dr. Kissinger by Han Hsu on July 18 has come as a shock to my Government. Its tone, regrettably, is reminiscent of a period in our relationships which I thought we had put behind us.

-- Nevertheless, we are pleased the Chinese side has invited Dr. Kissinger to visit Peking on August 16. Unfortunately, that date is inconvenient, and Dr. Kissinger has suggested to Mr. Han Hsu that he be issued an invitation to visit the People's Republic sometime after September 1.

-- Dr. Kissinger looks forward to hearing your views on his suggestion.

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The U.S. side has received the communication from the Chinese side proposing August 16 as the date for Dr. Kissinger's arrival in Peking. We regret that this date is inconvenient to the U.S. side.

It is suggested instead that the Chinese side propose a date after September 1 for a visit by Dr. Kissinger to Peking.

Given press reports both in the United States and China speculating on the possibility of an early August visit by Dr. Kissinger to Peking, the U.S. side believes it necessary that both sides be prepared to respond to press inquiries relating to plans for the visit. The U.S. side would be interested in the views of the Chinese side on responding to such inquiries.

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At a time when the Communist side is making a renewed and intensified effort to determine Cambodia's political future by force, the Chinese side's complaints about American military action are disingenuous. The US side and the Cambodian Government have consistently sought a ceasefire and political settlement in Cambodia since the January 27 Paris Agreement, and indeed since October 1970. The Communist side has continually refused to end the war in Cambodia and cynically responded to the Cambodian Government's unilateral ceasefire and cessation of US air actions in Cambodia in February with an intensified military offensive. In the face of this brutal military response to a genuine and concrete step to end hostilities in Cambodia, the comments of the Chinese side about US bombing ring very hollow.

The Chinese side solemnly declared to the US side in its message of June 4 that it could communicate the US peace proposal to Prince Sihanouk. It was stated in the June 4 message, and reiterated on June 13, by Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei and again in the Chinese message of July 6, that this awaited only the return of Prince Sihanouk from his travels. On July 6, Ambassador Huang Chen declared that the Chinese side would convey the US proposal to Prince Sihanouk now that he had returned to Peking.

After a further delay of nearly two weeks, the Chinese message of July 18 is therefore astonishing. There has been no change in US policy and no change in the situation to warrant this reversal of the Chinese position. In light of the above solemn assurances, and the principles and spirit of the

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Shanghai Communique, it is impossible to understand why the Chinese side is unable to communicate an American peace proposal to its Cambodian allies. Prince Sihanouk's suggestion that the US communicate with him through Mauritania is particularly incomprehensible, since he is residing in Peking and since the Chinese side itself asserted in prior messages the inconvenience of communicating with Prince Sihanouk through similar channels while he was traveling.

The US side notes, with regret, that this is the first time in the development of our new relationship that the Chinese side has not honored a commitment it has made to the US side.